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Abstract 
 Sections 45 and 63 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 
(TAA) confer drastic information gathering powers on officials of 
the South African Revenue Service (SARS). On the one hand, 
section 45 permits warrantless routine (non-targeted) and non-
routine (targeted) inspections by a SARS official in respect of 
records, books of accounts and documents found at premises 
where a taxpayer is reasonably believed to be conducting a 
trade or enterprise. The purpose of such inspection is to 
determine whether there has been compliance with specific 
obligations by the taxpayer. Section 63, on the other hand, 
permits, on the grounds of urgency and expediency in 
exceptional circumstances only, warrantless non-routine 
(targeted) searches by a senior SARS official of a taxpayer and 
of third parties associated with a taxpayer, as well as searches 
of a taxpayer's premises and those of third parties. In addition, 
section 63 permits the seizure of relevant material found at 
premises searched. All searches and seizures must occur for the 
purposes of the efficient and effective administration of tax Acts 
generally. A comparative analysis of sections 45 and 63 of the 
TAA reveals the existence of key differences in the substance 
and practical operation of their provisions. This article distils 
these differences through an in-depth discussion of the nature 
and extent of the powers of inspection and search conferred by 
these provisions, as well as by conceptualising the terms 
“inspection” and “search” for the purposes of sections 45 and 63 
respectively. 
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"Knowledge is power. Information is liberating." (Kofi Annan) 
1 Introduction 
The South African Revenue Service Act1 (SARS Act) establishes SARS as 
an organ of state whose aim, as described in section 3, "is the efficient and 
effective collection of revenue". Unless SARS has access to taxpayers' 
personal information that would enable it to determine a tax liability, tax 
collection will suffer. To ensure optimal tax collection, SARS requires 
powers of investigation, audit, verification, assessment and surveillance 
through enquiries, inspection and searches. Section 45 of the Tax 
Administration Act2 (TAA) permits warrantless inspections; section 63 
authorises warrantless searches. These public powers are potent weapons 
in SARS's information gathering arsenal, thereby resulting in a powerful tax 
administration agency with access to information in areas usually 
considered protected private space. Sections 45 and 63 reads:  
45.  Inspection. — (1) A SARS official may, for the purposes of the administration 
of a tax Act and without prior notice, arrive at a premises where the SARS 
official has a reasonable belief that a trade or enterprise is being carried on 
and conduct an inspection to determine only —  
(a) the identity of the person occupying the premises; 
(b) whether the person occupying the premises is registered for tax; or 
(c) whether the person is complying with sections 29 and 30.3 
(2)  A SARS official may not enter4 a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except 
any part thereof used for the purposes of trade, under this section without the 
consent of the occupant. … 
63.  Search without warrant. — (1) A senior SARS official may without a warrant 
exercise the powers referred to in section 61(3) — 
(a) if the owner or person in control of the premises so consents in writing; 
or 
(b) if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that —  
                                            
* Dr Fareed Moosa. BProc LLB LLM LLD (UWC). Attorney and Head of the 
Department of Mercantile and Labour Law, University of the Western Cape, South 
Africa. E-mail: fmoosa@uwc.ac.za. This article is an extraction of the writer's 2017 
LLD thesis: Moosa 1996 Constitution and the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011: 
Balancing Efficient and Effective Tax Administration with Taxpayers’ Rights. 
1  South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997. 
2  Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. 
3  Section 29 of the TAA obliges a person to keep "records, books of account or 
documents" that "enable the person to observe the requirements of a tax Act" and 
"enable SARS to be satisfied that the person has observed these requirements". 
Section 30 prescribes the form in which the records, books of account and 
documents concerned are to "be kept or retained". 
4  "Enter" is undefined in the TAA. Cohen Commissioner's Powers to Access 
Information 23 explains its dictionary meaning to be "go into a place". It is submitted 
that "enter" does not include the use of force or clandestine means to gain entry to 
premises for TAA purposes.  
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(i) there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant 
material likely to be found on the premises; 
(ii) if SARS applies for a search warrant under section 59, a search 
warrant will be issued; and5  
(iii)  the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the 
search and seizure. 
(2)  A SARS official must, before carrying out the search, inform the owner or 
person in control of the premises — 
(a) that the search is being conducted under this section; and 
(b) of the alleged failure to comply with an obligation imposed under a tax 
Act or tax offence that is the basis for the search.6 
(3)  Section 61(4) to (8) applies to a search conducted under this section. 
(4)  A SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except 
any part thereof used for purposes of trade, under this section without the 
consent of the occupant. … 
2 Objective and roadmap of the article 
A literature survey7 reveals the absence of a comparative analysis of 
sections 45 and 63. Also, the terms "inspection" and "search" have not been 
examined in their TAA context. This article will, at its outset, interpret these 
terms with reference to their purpose and location in the TAA's overall 
scheme. Establishing their limits is important to determining when SARS's 
conduct infringes upon or threatens a taxpayer's right to privacy, which is 
entrenched in SA's Constitution, 1996. The public powers exercisable at 
inspections and searches will be discussed in this context. Also, the 
requirements for a lawful search and inspection will be outlined. This is 
relevant to evaluating when SARS's conduct passes muster. The 
conclusion will draw together the threads of the discussion to distil key 
differences in the substance and operation of sections 45 and 63. 
3 Meaning of "inspection" and "search" 
Under section 40, a taxpayer may be selected "for inspection, verification or 
audit on the basis of any consideration relevant to the proper administration 
of a tax Act, including on a random or a risk assessment basis". Once a 
                                            
5  "And" has the effect that s 63(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) is to be read conjunctively 
(Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) para 50). 
The same applies to s 63(2)(a) and (b). Thus, a search is valid only if all the 
requirements of s 63(1)(b) are met. 
6  The provisions of s 63(2) reflect the decision in Ferucci v CSARS 2002 6 SA 219 (C) 
229A-D, 231A-C. Also see Goqwana v Minister of Safety 2016 1 All SA 629 (SCA) 
para 18.  
7  Moosa 2012 SA Merc LJ 338; Moosa 2012 ITJ 3; Bovijn and Van Schalkwyk 2012 
Stell LR 507; Vogelman and Muller 2014 ITJ 12; Keulder 2015 SALJ 819; Clegg 
Concise Guide; Klue, Arendse and Williams Silke on Tax Administration; Croome 
and Olivier Tax Administration; Van Dijk A Probe into the Constitutionality of 
Relevant Sections. 
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taxpayer has been selected, a SARS official may then arrive, unannounced, 
at the taxpayer's premises and, without warrant, conduct an inspection or 
search. Although undefined for TAA purposes, inspections and searches 
differ. These terms are not used synonymously or interchangeably. Sections 
45 and 63 are important weapons in SARS's armoury to protect and 
preserve South Africa's tax base and the State's sources of income. To 
ensure that SARS utilises its section 45 and 63 powers responsibly and in 
a manner consistent with the Constitution and the legislature's intention, 
“inspection” and “search must be interpreted within their TAA framework. 
3.1 Inspection: nature and extent 
Section 45 inspections are not aimed at finding a breach of a tax statute. 
They are geared to gathering information that advances SARS's ability to 
police compliance with the taxpayer's duties referred to in section 45(1)(b) 
and (c). The fiscus will suffer losses if persons liable to register for tax fail 
to do so, or fail to maintain proper, adequate or orderly business records 
that would hinder the detection of undisclosed income. Therefore, 
inspections promote optimal tax assessment and collection for public 
benefit. The public's interest in and benefit from section 45(1)(a) and (b) is 
that it enables SARS to identify taxpayers more effectively. The public's 
interest in, and benefit from section 45(1)(c) is that its provisions enable 
SARS to ensure the availability of adequate records for audits and 
investigations aimed at revenue determination or estimation, or at verifying 
proper disclosure of information required under a "tax Act" as defined. 
An inspection under section 45 is a preliminary or preparatory fact-finding 
exercise because facts uncovered may lead to an audit or criminal 
investigation (section 48), and/or to inquiry proceedings (section 52), and/or 
to an application for a search warrant (sections 59, 60, 61), and/or to a 
criminal charge (section 234). If non-compliance under section 45(1)(b) or 
(c) amounts to the commission of an offence under section 234(a) or (e), 
then a prosecution may ensue. Viewed in this light, a warrantless inspection 
may provide SARS with a way to uncover evidence of a tax offence without 
the need to apply for a warrant under section 59(1).8 
                                            
8  Croome and Olivier Tax Administration 117 argue that s 45 cannot be used to search 
for documents, or to review a taxpayer's records, or to conduct an audit. Keulder 
2015 SALJ 845 warns that a warrantless inspection may be used by SARS with 
improper motives to achieve the goals of s 63 without the need to satisfy the stricter 
requirements for a warrantless search. The risk of SARS abusing its power under ss 
45 or 63 for ulterior or nefarious purposes would not justify a constitutional challenge 
of their provisions. See S v Van Rooyen 2002 5 SA 246 (CC) para 37; Head of 
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The nature and extent of the powers exercisable at inspections are unclear 
because the TAA is silent on this issue. This necessitates interpretation of 
"inspection".9 The starting point is to consider its plain, natural meaning (that 
is, the meaning it bears in common parlance or ordinary colloquial 
speech).10 This is referred to as grammatical (linguistic) interpretation.11 A 
linguistic construction of section 45(1) shows that "inspection" is not utilised 
there in a technical sense but in its grammatical sense. Linguistically in 
section 45(1), "inspection" is a noun. The Oxford Thesaurus12 defines 
inspection as a noun meaning "examination, check-up, survey, scrutiny, 
probe, exploration, observation, investigation, assessment, appraisal, 
review, evaluation". Inspection cannot, in section 45(1), bear all these 
meanings. Its meaning must be narrowed by context. This is referred to as 
contextual interpretation.13 Section 45 operates in tandem with section 31 
whose subject matter, apparent from its heading,14 is "inspection of 
records".15 A contextual reading of their respective provisions indicates that 
                                            
Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 
415 (CC) para 72. Since courts are responsible for preventing the unfair, 
unauthorised, oppressive and vexatious use of power, a taxpayer ought to challenge 
the lawfulness of a specific inspection or search (as the case may be). 
9  For the rules of interpretation, see Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 18-23. 
10  Association of Amusement and Novelty Machine Operators v Minister of Justice 
1980 2 SA 636 (A) 660. 
11  Grammatical interpretation entails that, in the absence of a legislated meaning or 
judicial ruling, a word bears its meaning as generally used, which can be ascertained 
with reference to a dictionary (Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 88-92; Sasria Ltd v Slabbert Burger 
Transport (Pty) Ltd 2008 5 SA 270 (SCA) para 9).  
12  Waite, Hollingworth and Marshall Oxford Paperback Thesaurus 443.  
13  Contextual interpretation entails ascribing meaning to words according to their 
"setting and surrounds" (Standard General Ins v Commissioner for Customs and 
Excise 2005 2 SA 166 (SCA) para 25), even though their meaning may be clear and 
unambiguous (Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 
2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53). Put differently, words would be meaningless if read in 
the abstract or isolated from context (Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price 
Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) para 12; Novartis v Maphil 2016 1 SA 518 (SCA) 
para 28). "In law, context is everything" (Aktiebolaget Hassle v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 
2003 1 SA 155 (SCA) para 1). Contextual interpretation "is not limited to the 
language of the rest of the statute 'as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part 
to be interpreted' and 'often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its 
apparent scope and purpose and within limits, its background'" (Ahmed v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2016 JOL 36695 (WCC) para 15).  
14  A heading is relevant for interpretation (Botha Statutory Interpretation 80). 
15  Section 31 of the TAA reads: "The records, books of account and documents 
referred to in section 29 … must at all reasonable times during the required periods 
under section 29, be open for inspection by a SARS official in the Republic for the 
purpose of — (a) determining compliance with the requirements of sections 29 and 
30; or (b) an inspection, audit or investigation under Chapter 5." Section 1 defines 
"document" as "anything that contains a written, sound or pictorial record, or other 
record of information, whether in physical or electronic form". Section 1 also defines 
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inspection under section 45 entails no more than an examination of records, 
books of account or documents for the purpose of making an objective 
determination of the facts listed in sections 45(1)(a), (b) and (c). Thus, 
inspections do not per se take place in relation to premises where such 
material are kept. The phrase in section 45(1), namely, "to determine only", 
narrows the purpose for which an inspection may be undertaken. 
Linguistically, the disjunctive "or" between sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) 
indicates that the items in the list in section 45(1)(a), (b) and (c) are not 
stated conjunctively but rather in the alternative.16 Therefore, an inspection 
need be aimed at making only one (not all) of the determinations concerned. 
SARS's power to enter premises for inspection purposes does not include 
the power to search or seize. Section 45 does not refer to the power (i) to 
conduct any body search, (ii) to remove or seize any item, (iii) to rifle through 
private possessions, or (iv) to probe for information, whether by inquiry, 
interrogation or other mode of questioning. SARS is a creation of statute 
with no inherent powers or competencies. These must stem from an 
empowering provision in legislation.17 Since the aforementioned powers are 
not mentioned in relation to inspections, they are excluded from section 45. 
This renders inspections under the TAA less intrusive than searches 
thereunder. Sections 31(b) and 40 of the TAA quoted above differentiate 
between inspections, audits and investigations. Applying the maxim 
expressio unius est alterius exclusio,18 reference to "inspection" in section 
45 excludes audits and investigations.19 This interpretation is consonant 
with an inspection's purpose in sections 45(1) read with 3(2),20 and also best 
                                            
"information" as including "information generated, recorded, sent, received, stored 
or displayed by any means". The definition of "document" includes electronic 
communication per the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, 
discussed in Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash 2015 2 
SA 118 (SCA).  
16  MV Iran Dastghayb Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Terra-Marine SA 2010 
6 SA 493 (SCA) para 22; Master Currency (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 2013 3 All SA 135 
(SCA) para 15. 
17  AM Moolla Group Ltd v CSARS 2005 JOL 15456 (T) 3. 
18  Translated as "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other". 
19  De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 131. 
20  An inspection must be "for the purposes of the administration of a tax Act". This 
stipulation is probably not a qualification of the powers in s 45. See Gaertner v 
Minister of Finance 2014 1 SA 442 (CC) para 38. S 3(2) defines "administration of a 
tax Act" to mean "to – (a) obtain full information in relation to – (i) anything that may 
affect the liability of a person for tax in respect of a previous, current or future tax 
period; (ii) a taxable event; or (iii) the obligation of a person (whether personally or 
on behalf of another person) to comply with a tax Act; (b) ascertain whether a person 
has filed or submitted correct returns, information or documents in compliance with 
the provisions of a tax Act; (c) establish the identity of a person for purposes of 
determining liability for tax; (d) determine the liability of a person for tax; (e) collect 
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advances the attainment of the TAA's broader aims listed in section 2.21 
This is referred to as purposive interpretation.22 
An inspection is intrusive of privacy, albeit a lower level invasiveness.23 Is a 
section 45 inspection a "search" under section 14(a) and/or (b) of the 
Constitution?24 If yes, it is a limitation, under section 36(1) of the 
Constitution, which SARS must justify.25. This is a factual question in each 
instance. Except for regulatory searches,26 South African courts have 
refrained from making a definitive ruling of when an inspection is a 
                                            
tax debts and refund tax overpaid; (f) investigate whether a tax offence has been 
committed, and, if so, - (i) to lay criminal charges; and (ii) to provide the assistance 
that is reasonably required for the investigation and prosecution of the tax offence; 
(g) enforce SARS' powers and duties under a tax Act to ensure that an obligation 
imposed by or under a tax Act is complied with; (h) perform any other administrative 
function necessary to carry out the provisions of a tax Act; (i) give effect to the 
obligation of the Republic to provide assistance under an international tax 
agreement; and (j) give effect to an international standard".  
21  Section 2 of the TAA reads: "The purpose of this Act is to ensure the effective and 
efficient collection of tax by — (a) aligning the administration of the tax Acts to the 
extent practically possible; (b) prescribing the rights and obligations of taxpayers and 
other persons to whom this Act applies; (c) prescribing the powers and duties of 
persons engaged in the administration of a tax Act; and (d) generally giving effect to 
the objects and purposes of tax administration." 
22  Purposive interpretation gives effect to a meaning that best advances the fulfilment 
of the broader aims of a statute (Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General 
Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 17-20). Purpose is 
important to establish a context that clarifies the scope and intended effect of a law 
(Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 2 SA 181 (CC) para 
21). Purpose is reflected in a statute's language read with its underlying policy or 
object, and its overall scheme and scope. Purpose is unrelated to parliamentary 
intention and must be distinguished from the mischief that a statute, or a provision 
in it, aims to overcome (Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 
2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 21-23). For a summary of factors when ascertaining 
legislative purpose, see Minister of Land Affairs v Slamdien 1999 4 BCLR 413 (LCC) 
422. Also see Goldswain 2008 MAR 107, 117-119. 
23  By virtue of the TAA authorising inspections on "a random or a risk assessment 
basis" (s 40), two types of inspections are licensed, namely, random, routine, non-
targeted inspections, and risk assessment-based, non-routine, targeted inspections. 
Both forms of inspection are means of testing compliance (Gaertner v Minister of 
Finance 2014 1 SA 442 (CC) para 60). Clegg Concise Guide 86 explains "risk 
assessment" as referring "to the use of an analytic tool which profiles taxpayers 
according to the likelihood, on a statistical basis, that some or other shortfall exists 
in their tax affairs".  
24  Section 14 reads: "Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to 
have- (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their 
possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed."  
25  Phillips v DPP, Witwatersrand Local Division 2003 3 SA 345 (CC) para 19. For the 
constitutionality of s 45 vis a vis taxpayers' privacy, see Moosa 1996 Constitution 
and the Tax Administration Act 285-334, 379-445. 
26  Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board 2006 5 SA 250 (CC) para 59. 
It is unclear from the TAA whether s 45 inspections are regulatory or administrative. 
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"search".27 When making this determination, relevant considerations 
include an inspection's aim, the legislation's underlying purpose, an affected 
person's privacy expectation, and the extent of the intrusion permitted by 
the statute, having regard to the nature and extent of the powers of 
inspection.28 See 4.1 below. 
3.2 Search: nature and extent 
The TAA does not confer a general power to conduct searches.29 Section 
63 permits warrantless searches where performing them is reasonable or 
just, owing to alleged non-compliance with a duty or the commission of an 
offence.30 Thus, it licenses targeted, non-routine searches. The subject of 
section 63 is the gathering of taxpayer information,31 including "relevant 
material" defined as "any information, document or thing that in the opinion 
of SARS is foreseeably32 relevant for the administration of a tax Act as 
referred to in section 3".33 When read with sections 6(1)34 and 63(2)(b) of 
the TAA, this definition shows that SARS's powers in section 63 are aimed 
at obtaining (reasonably) relevant (not necessary)35 information for the 
criminal and/or civil enforcement of tax laws. Thus, warrantless searches 
are conducted with the object inter alia of protecting and preserving the 
integrity, availability and/or accessibility of "relevant material". Ultimately, 
                                            
27  See Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of SA 1998 4 SA 1127 (CC) para 
23. 
28  Gupta 2013 NZJTLP 222, 226-235.  
29  Croome and Olivier Tax Administration 163. 
30  To be valid, a search does not need to relate to the investigation of a crime (South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2000 10 BCLR 1131 (T) 
1165). 
31  "Taxpayer information" bears the meaning as defined in ss 1 read with 67(1)(b) of 
the TAA, namely, "any information provided by a taxpayer or obtained by SARS in 
respect of the taxpayer, including biometric information". Biometric information, as 
defined in s 1 of the TAA, encompasses intrusive biological data, such as, facial 
recognition, fingerprint recognition, voice recognition, and iris or retina recognition. 
For the constitutionality of the power to obtain intrusive biological data, see S v Huma 
1995 2 SACR 411 (W).   
32  Clegg Concise Guide 85 warns: "'Forseeable' relevance is clearly in the eye of the 
beholder and may open the possibility of 'fishing expeditions' being undertaken 
through requests for information of no direct relevance to a particular line of enquiry." 
33  For a discussion of "relevant material", see Van der Walt 2015 https://sait.site-
ym.com/news/212759/SARS-Information-gathering-powers-the-amended-
definition-of-relevant-material-.htm. Also see Vogelman and Muller 2014 ITJ 12. 
34  Section 6(1) reads: "The powers and duties of SARS under this Act may be 
exercised for purposes of the administration of a tax Act." In terms of s 10(1) of the 
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, a power "shall be performed from time to time as 
occasion requires". 
35  To this end, s 63 may be compared with s 59(1) of the TAA, the relevant part whereof 
reads: "A senior SARS official may, if necessary or relevant to administer a tax Act, 
authorise an application for a warrant" (my emphasis)  
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such operations aim to avoid harm to State fiscal interests caused by delay 
and/or by the loss of access to relevant material resulting from the strict 
adherence to formalities and legal niceties in the form of a warrant.36 In so 
doing, warrantless searches combat tax delinquency and promote the 
efficient and effective administration of tax.37 
The question of what constitutes a "search" is a factual issue to be answered 
by adopting a common sense approach. In general terms, a search is "an 
examination of a person or property".38 As discussed below in 5.2, during a 
search SARS officials can open anything and scour through personal 
possessions, including confidential communications. Also, they can conduct 
a body search, copy material, and remove and retain possession of 
computers and other storage devices. Thus, for TAA purposes a search 
may be described as "any act whereby a person, container or premises is 
visually or physically examined with the object of establishing whether an 
article is in, on or upon such person, container or premises".39 
A search has the potential to cause hardship to a taxpayer through the 
institution of criminal or civil proceedings.40 Moreover, by its nature, a search 
infringes upon or threatens a range of fundamental rights (such as dignity, 
freedom, bodily security, privacy and property).41 This raises the question: 
Is a search under section 63 of the TAA a "search" envisaged by section 14 
                                            
36  A fair balance must be struck between fiscal efficiency and general State interests, 
as well as taxpayers' rights (Goqwana v Minister of Safety 2016 1 All SA 629 (SCA) 
para 14). 
37  Klue, Arendse and Williams Silke on Tax Administration para 8.6.2 contend that s 
63 "assist in tax base broadening and addressing the reality that tax evaders who, 
upon approach by SARS, waste no time in destroying all records and evidence of 
their fraudulent activities and details of income derived". Keulder 2015 SALJ 820 
writes: "The justification for a warrantless search is that it enables SARS to act 
straight away, thus preventing tax evaders from destroying or hiding evidence of 
their evasion. If SARS were required first to obtain a warrant, tax evaders would have 
the opportunity to destroy relevant documentation." Croome Taxpayers' Rights 142 
states that the "power to search premises and seize documents is a necessary part 
of the Commissioner's armoury to ensure tax compliance". If documents are 
protected by privilege, then s 64 of the TAA applies. For the nature of privileged 
material, see Bogoshi v Van Vuuren; Bogoshi v Director, Officer for Serious 
Economic Offences 1996 1 SA 785 (A); Thint (Pty) Ltd v NDPP; Zuma v NDPP 2009 
1 SA 1 (CC); A Company v CSARS 2014 4 SA 549 (WCC); South African Airways 
SOC v BDFM Publishers (Pty) Ltd 2016 JOL 35097 (GJ). Also see Croome and 
Olivier Tax Administration 168-185; Tiley 2002 CLJ 540.  
38  Gupta 2013 Australian Journal of Taxation 138. 
39  Basdeo 2009 PELJ 309. Also see R v Jefferies 1994 1 NZLR 290 (CA) 300.  
40  Ferucci v CSARS 2002 6 SA 219 (C) 227D-E. Also see Mosupa 2001 Stell LR 317. 
41  Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of SA 1998 4 SA 1127 (CC) para 25; 
Platinum Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Financial Services Board; Anglo Rand 
Capital House (Pty) Ltd v Financial Services Board 2006 4 SA 73 (W) para 127.  
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of the Constitution? It is submitted that it is.42 This view is supported by 
section 63’s using the same terminology as section 14 (quoted in n 23), 
namely search and seize.43 Moreover, the nature and extent of the powers 
of entry, observation and removal exercisable at a search, discussed below 
in 5.2, bring a search within the remit of section 14. Consequently, section 
63 restricts taxpayers' privacy as envisaged by the limitation clause in 
section 36(1) of the Constitution. To be valid, SARS's exercise of its powers 
of search and seizure must be justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.44 
4  Powers exercisable at warrantless inspections and 
searches 
4.1  Inspections 
Section 45 confers discretion ("may")45 on a SARS official to conduct a 
warrantless inspection. Whereas section 45(2) confers the power of entry to 
premises albeit subject to an occupant's consent, section 45(1) makes no 
reference at all to the power of entry.46 This is noteworthy because, as 
                                            
42  Sopinka J, in Baron v Canada 1993 13 CRR (2nd) 65 (SCC) 84-85 describes the 
invasiveness of a search as follows: "Physical search of private premises … is the 
greatest intrusion of privacy short of a violation of bodily integrity." 
43  A seizure of property must, under s 61(8) of the TAA, be for the investigative 
purposes specified there. "Seizure" is not a term of art. It implies "a forcible 
deprivation of possession" (Green v Commissioner of Customs and Excise 1941 
WLD 128 133). Also, see Naidoo v CIR 58 SATC 251 260. Since seizure entails the 
act of taking possession of an article discovered and its detention, its essence is the 
"effective deprivation of the owner's control" (Rudolph v CIR 1996 4 SA 552 (CC) 
para 11). The Court, in R v Dyment 1988 2 SCR 417 431, defined the essence of a 
seizure as the "taking of a thing from a person by a public authority without that 
person's consent". Whether or not a deprivation is a seizure is a question of fact.  
44  For the constitutionality of s 63 vis a vis taxpayers' privacy, see Moosa 1996 
Constitution and the Tax Administration Act 285-334, 379-445. 
45  For a discussion of the permissive roles of "may", see CIR v I H B King; CIR v A H 
King 1947 2 SA 196 (A) 209; MY Summit One: Farocean Marine (Pty) Ltd v Malacca 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2005 1 SA 428 (SCA) 439C. For the distinction between directory 
and peremptory provisions, see Sutter v Scheepers 1932 AD 163 173; Pottie v Kotze 
1954 3 SA 719 (A) 725-726; Nkisimane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1978 2 SA 430 
(A) 433H–434E; Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) para 13; Weenen 
Transitional Local Council v Van Dyk 2000 3 SA 435 (N) 442-445. For circumstances 
when "may" can mean "shall", see Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR 1974 36 SATC 143 
(E) 151; Northwest Townships (Pty) Ltd v Administrator, Transvaal 1975 4 SA 1 (T) 
12H-13A; South African Police Service v Public Servants Association 2007 3 SA 521 
(CC) paras 14-20.  
46  Section 63(1) of the TAA also omits stipulating that a senior SARS official may enter 
premises to conduct a search. It merely states that "the powers referred to in section 
61(3)" may be exercised without a warrant. As is evident from 5.2 below, those 
powers do not expressly include an authority to enter premises. Subject to contextual 
changes, it is submitted that, by using the same reasoning adopted here in relation 
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stated above, SARS is a creation of statute imbued with only those powers 
conferred statutorily. A purposive construction of section 45(1) indicates that 
the power of entry is implied therein. Unless this is so, its provisions would 
be ineffectual. This is because, but for the construction espoused here, 
inspections would be possible only under section 45(2), namely of those 
parts of a dwelling-house or domestic premises used for trade purposes. 
Such a state of affairs would undermine the attainment of the aim of section 
45(1) discussed above in 4.1. Having regard to the common purpose of 
sections 45(1) and (2), logic dictates that the legislature must have intended 
to confer common powers to enable SARS to give effect to the aim of its 
provisions. This supports the view that the power of entry is implied into 
section 45(1). Furthermore, section 45(1) is the dominant or primary 
provision in section 45. This is evident from its containing the jurisdictional 
requirements for conducting inspections under section 45(1) and (2). See 
para 5 below. Thus, it would be illogical if the power of entry were lacking 
from the dominant section 45(1) but was contained in section 45(2), a 
provision of secondary importance in the context of section 45. 
Inspections are permitted at premises where a "trade or enterprise" is 
conducted. The TAA does not define "trade" or "enterprise" for its purposes. 
Section 1 states that for TAA purposes, "unless the context indicates 
otherwise, a term which is assigned a meaning in another tax Act has the 
meaning so assigned". The Income Tax Act47 and Value-Added Tax Act48 
are "tax Act"s as defined in section 1 of the TAA. The former defines 
"trade";49 the latter defines "enterprise".50 There is no indication in the TAA 
that their meanings as defined in these tax Acts are inconsistent with their 
context in section 45 of the TAA. Thus, it is submitted that "trade" and 
                                            
to s 45(1), the power to enter premises is incorporated into s 63(1) by necessary 
implication.  
47  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
48  Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. 
49  Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 defines "trade" as including "every 
profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture, including 
the letting of any property and the use of or the grant of permission to use any patent 
as defined in the Patents Act or any design as defined in the Designs Act or any 
trade mark as defined in the Trade Marks Act or any copyright as defined in the 
Copyright Act or any other property which is of a similar nature". 
50  In terms of s 1 of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, an "enterprise" means "any 
enterprise or activity which is carried on continuously or regularly by any person in 
the Republic or partly in the Republic and in the course or furtherance of which goods 
or services are supplied to any other person for a consideration, whether or not for 
profit, including any enterprise or activity carried on in the form of a commercial, 
financial, industrial, mining, farming, fishing, municipal or professional concern or 
any other concern of a continuing nature or in the form of an association or club".  
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"enterprise" in section 45 bear the meanings ascribed in the Income Tax 
and Value-Added Tax Acts respectively. 
Section 45(2) permits entry to "any part … used for the purposes of trade".51 
No reference is made to an "enterprise". This raises the question: Can a 
SARS official enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises under section 
45(2) where an enterprise is conducted? The answer depends on whether 
"trade" in section 45(2) encompasses an "enterprise". It is submitted that it 
does not. A narrow construction of "trade" in this context ought to be 
favoured because, first, it preserves and protects the right inter alia to 
privacy of a person carrying on an enterprise. This construction promotes 
the values of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, which is an integral part of “spirit” of the Bill of Rights 
as contemplated by section 39(2) of the Constitution.52 Secondly, 
interpreting "trade" in section 45(2) as excluding an enterprise would align 
its meaning with that of "trade" as used in section 45(1). A construction that 
ensures that "trade" in section 45(2) is not broader in scope and ambit than 
in section 45(1) accords favourably with the presumption of interpretation 
that the same word in a statute bears the same meaning throughout, unless 
its context indicates otherwise.53 
4.2  Searches 
Under section 63(1) read with section 61(3) of the TAA, a SARS official has 
discretion ("may") at a warrantless search (i) to "open or cause to be opened 
or removed in conducting a search, anything which the official suspects to 
contain relevant material" (section 61(3)(a)), (ii) to "seize any relevant 
material" (section 61(3)(b)), (iii) to "seize and retain a computer or storage 
device in which relevant material is stored for as long as it is necessary to 
copy the material required", such as, iPhones, smart phones and cell 
phones (section 61(3)(c)), (iv) to "make extracts from or copies of relevant 
material, and require from a person an explanation of relevant material" 
(section 61(3)(d)), (v) if the premises is a vessel, aircraft or vehicle, to "stop 
and board the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, search the vessel, aircraft or 
vehicle or a person found in the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and question the 
person with respect to a matter dealt with in a tax Act" (section 61(3)(e)), 
                                            
51  For the meaning of "for purposes of trade", see De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 
1986 1 SA 8 (A) 35-37; Solaglass Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1991 2 SA 257 (A) 
271-272; Burgess v CIR 1993 4 SA 161 (A) 179-182.  
52  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) reads: "When interpreting any legislation … every court, tribunal or 
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
53  S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 4 SA 623 (CC) para 47. 
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and (vi) to "search a person if the official is of the same gender as the person 
being searched" (section 61(5)). 
The guidelines for the execution of a warrantless search are, in terms of 
section 63(3), contained in sections 61(4)-(8) of the TAA. They include that 
an inventory be made of all relevant material seized and a copy be provided 
to the person whose premises were searched (section 61(4)), and that every 
search occurs with strict regard for decency and order (section 61(5)). The 
latter provision is designed to respect and protect an affected person's 
fundamental rights to human dignity and bodily integrity. In terms of section 
61(6), a search may occur with the assistance of a police officer who is 
obliged to acquiesce in a request by SARS ("must render the assistance"). 
Under section 61(7), no person may "obstruct a SARS official or a police 
officer" from executing a search, or "without reasonable excuse refuse to 
give such assistance as may be reasonably required". Although 
"assistance" is not defined for TAA purposes, the nature thereof would entail 
performing acts of the kind referred to in section 49(1), namely, "making 
available appropriate facilities,54 to the extent that such facilities are 
available", "answering questions", and "submitting relevant material as 
required". In terms of section 234 of the TAA, it is an offence for anyone to 
"wilfully and without just cause" refuse or neglect to "furnish, produce or 
make available any information, document or thing" (section 234(h)(i)), or to 
obstruct or hinder a SARS official in the discharge of official duties (section 
234(k)), or refuse to give assistance as required by section 49(1) (section 
234(l)).55 
Section 63 contains a contradiction. Whereas section 63(1) empowers a 
"senior SARS official" to conduct a search, section 63(2) and (4) refers to a 
"SARS official"56 carrying out a search. A SARS official and senior SARS 
                                            
54  "Appropriate facilities" are those required for "effective, suitable, proper or fitting" 
(Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic 
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 SA 580 (CC) para 71) execution 
of SARS's duties. Thus construed, "appropriate facilities" would, depending on 
circumstances, include a toilet, scanner, fax machine, computer, telephone, USB 
device, internet, email, photocopier, and access to a work station, lighting, water and 
electricity.  
55  In terms of s 8(2) of the TAA, when exercising any power, such as an inspection or 
search, a SARS official must produce an identity card upon request by any affected 
person. Failure to do so would, under section 8(3), entitle the requester "to assume 
that the person is not a SARS official" and thus refuse entry to the requester’s 
premises and justifiably withhold co-operation. 
56  "SARS official" is defined in s 1 of the TAA to mean "(a) the Commissioner; (b) an 
employee of SARS; or (c) a person contracted or engaged by SARS, other than an 
external legal representative, for purposes of the administration of a tax Act and who 
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official are distinguishable functionaries created by the TAA specifically for 
its purpose. Except for the Commissioner of SARS, who is included in the 
definition of both terms in section 1 of the TAA, every other category of 
"SARS official" is not a "senior SARS official" but may be conferred the latter 
designation.57 Therefore, a SARS official as defined may not exercise the 
powers in section 63(1) read with section 61(3) unless he/she is also a 
senior SARS official.58 Section 6(4) of the TAA permits "a SARS official 
under the control of" a senior SARS official to execute "a task ancillary to a 
power or duty" to be exercised by a senior SARS official. This provision 
does not, it is submitted, resolve the contradiction in section 63. This is so 
because, in relation to section 63(1), the authority conferred by section 6(4) 
applies only to the execution of tasks that are "ancillary to a power" 
exercised by a senior SARS official under sections 63(1) read with 61(3). In 
other words, section 6(4) does not grant a SARS official the powers listed 
in section 61(3) for the purpose of effecting a warrantless search. This 
contradiction may be resolved by applying the rules of statutory 
interpretation. It is submitted that the reference in sections 63(2) and (4) to 
a "SARS official" ought to be read as meaning such a SARS official who 
also qualifies as a senior SARS official. This result promotes the purpose of 
the provision and aligns with the context of these subsections when read 
with the other relevant TAA provisions referred to here.59 
5 Jurisdictional requirements for warrantless inspections 
and searches 
The powers conferred by sections 45 and 63 are designed inter alia to 
combat the mischief of taxpayer dishonesty and delinquency that is 
prejudicial to the fiscus. Since the powers are conferred for public benefit, 
                                            
carries out the provisions of a tax Act under the control, direction or supervision of 
the Commissioner". 
57  Moosa 2012 SA Merc LJ 344-345. The TAA sets no criteria, such as age, rank, 
status, qualification, knowledge, expertise or years of experience, for anyone to have 
the "senior SARS official" designation. In terms of ss 6(3)(a), (b) and (c), the powers 
and duties of a senior SARS official may be exercised by (i) Commissioner of SARS, 
(ii) a SARS official who has "specific written authority from the Commissioner to do 
so", or (iii) a SARS official "occupying a post designated by the Commissioner in 
writing for this purpose". 
58  Moosa 2012 SA Merc LJ 344-345. See also Keulder 2015 SALJ 843; Bovijn and Van 
Schalkwyk 2012 Stell LR 511. 
59  Sections 45 and 63 do not empower SARS officials to (i) intercept communications, 
(ii) engage in eavesdropping or electronic surveillance, or (iii) "tap" a telephone by 
planting a bug or other listening device. Such conduct would be an actionable 
invasion of a taxpayer's privacy.  
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they must be exercised in the public interest and not on a whim.60 Good 
cause must exist when the powers are exercised. If absent, or it cannot be 
shown to have existed when an inspection or search occurred, then there 
would be little substance left of a taxpayer's privacy.61 This is antithetical to 
the Constitution, which places a high premium on the protection, promotion, 
preservation and fulfilment of all fundamental rights. 
Sections 45 and 63 impose good cause criteria for a lawful inspection and 
search respectively. These will now be discussed. 
5.1 Good cause under section 45 
Under section 45(1), an inspection may occur if "reasonable belief" exists 
that a trade or enterprise "is being carried on" at the place where an 
inspection will occur. Section 45(1) does not require a reasonable belief or 
suspicion that the occupant of the premises is unregistered for tax or non-
compliant with sections 29 and/or 30 of the TAA. An inspection will not be 
rendered unlawful if it reveals that a trade or enterprise is not being carried 
on at the premises: Provided the SARS official who exercised the discretion 
under section 45(1) was privy to facts that led to a reasonable belief that a 
trade or enterprise was being conducted there. If this belief is later found to 
be misplaced, then this fact alone would not justify declaring the inspection 
unlawful. Although section 45(2) does not refer to the reasonable belief 
criterion, uniformity in the application of tax laws, a component of the rule of 
law, justifies this triggering requirement applying equally to section 45(1) 
and (2). 
"Reasonable belief", and its variants "reasonable grounds to believe"62 and 
"reasonable grounds is satisfied",63 are objective standards. The 
                                            
60  Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 2 All 
SA 175 (E) para 53. 
61  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 
54. 
62  The criterion "reasonable grounds to believe" is used in the TAA in ss 60(1) 
(issuance of a search warrant) and in 62(1) (search of premises not identified in a 
warrant). For a discussion thereof, see Bovijn and Van Schalkwyk 2012 Stell LR 512-
513. Kubushi J, in Huang v CSARS: In re CSARS v Huang 2015 77 SATC 283 (GP) 
para 46, held: "That reasonable grounds must be established does not mean prima 
facie proof. What is of importance is that on the total picture presented by SARS … 
reasonable grounds to believe that the applicants had failed to comply with their 
obligations under the tax Acts or had committed offences under those Acts, were 
established."  
63  This variant is used in, for example, s 63(1)(b) of the TAA discussed below at 5.2.2. 
For the meaning of "satisfied", see Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 2 SA 
226 (T) 228A-B; ITC 1470 52 SATC 88 92; Farjas (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims 
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reasonable belief standard has not yet been judicially considered in its 
context in section 45. As regard its possible meaning, the following dictum 
per Plasket J in NDPP v Stander64 is instructive: 
It is clear from the cases that reason to believe that a state of affairs exists 
involves an objectively justifiable belief – ‘a belief based on reason’ in which a 
‘factual basis for the reason’ exists. There must, in other words, be ‘grounds, 
or facts, which give rise to, or form the basis of, the belief’ and they must be 
reasonable grounds. That the belief must be objectively rational (even … 
when more subjective language is used in a statute) is now a constitutional 
imperative, flowing from the founding value of the rule of law. 
Linguistically, the phrase "any part thereof used for purposes of trade" 
(section 45(2)) ought to be construed as "any part thereof currently being 
used for purposes of trade" at the time when the inspection occurs. This 
interpretation accords with the present tense of the phrase in section 45(1), 
namely, "a trade or enterprise is being carried on". Therefore, sections 45(1) 
and (2) envisage an ongoing business operation when the inspection 
occurs. On this basis, an inspection may not occur in relation to a business 
that is dormant, closed down, or otherwise non-operational. In these 
circumstances, the information gathering methods of sections 46, 47, 48 
and 52 may be used. If the business is simply temporarily not functional, 
such as for lunchtime or a public holiday or a weekend, then the inspection 
may occur, since the trade or enterprise "is being carried on", albeit not at 
the specific moment when the inspection commences. If a business has 
relocated, then an inspection must occur at the new premises where the 
business "is being carried on". Thus, it is a factual issue in each instance 
whether "a trade or enterprise is being carried on" at the place where an 
inspection occurs and whether an activity engaged in constitutes a "trade or 
enterprise". 
5.2 Good cause under section 63 
Section 63 authorises consensual and non-consensual warrantless 
searches. In terms of section 63(1)(a), a search may be conducted if "the 
                                            
Commissioner, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 5 BCLR 579 (LCC) para 41. As regards proof 
of "satisfaction", see Natal Estates Ltd v CIR 1975 4 SA 177 (A) 208. In COT v CW 
(Pvt) Ltd 1990 2 SA 245 (ZS) 265D, "reasonable" was held to imply "intelligent care 
and deliberation". 
64  NDPP v Stander 2008 1 SACR 116 (E) para 13. For the meaning of "reason to 
believe", see Bert's Bricks (Pty) Ltd v Inspector of Mines, North West Region 2012 
ZAGPPHC 11 (9 February 2012) para 10. In Hunter v Southam Inc 1984 11 DLR 
(4th) 641 (SCC) 658, the Court held that a "reasonable belief that relevant evidence 
may be uncovered" constitutes "a very low standard that would validate intrusion on 
the basis of suspicion, and authorise fishing expeditions of considerable latitude".  
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owner or person in control of the premises so consents in writing".65 This 
provision applies to all "premises",66 save for dwelling-houses and domestic 
premises67 as these are dealt with under section 63(4). It permits searches 
of such parts thereof used for trade purposes if consent is granted by "the 
occupant".68 Under section 63(1)(b), a search may be conducted if, 
subjectively on reasonable grounds, a senior SARS official is satisfied that 
the requirements listed in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) are met.69 These 
are the good cause criteria which must be met for a lawful search to occur 
under section 63(1)(a) and (b). The disjunctive "or" between subsections (a) 
and (b) indicates that they apply as alternatives. They do not operate in a 
hierarchical fashion: subsection (b) is not available only if consent under 
subsection (a) is refused. Therefore, a senior SARS official has the 
discretion to implement section 63(1)(b) without first attempting to obtain 
consent under section 63(1)(a). 
5.2.1 Warrantless searches by consent 
Whereas section 63(1)(a) requires written consent, section 63(4) does not. 
Consequently, section 63(4) permits oral, implied and tacit consent. An 
unwritten consent creates fertile ground for disputes and uncertainty. A 
written consent is an objective fact reflecting an authorisation. The 
document serves as proof of consent. In cases of doubt, its wording may be 
construed to ascertain its underlying aim. Except for the formality that, for 
the purposes of section 63(1)(a), consent must be in writing,70 the TAA sets 
no other requirement for the granting of a valid consent.71 In this regard, 
                                            
65  In terms of s 3 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, "writing" includes "typewriting, 
lithography, photography and all other modes of representing or reproducing words 
in visible form". 
66  Section 1 of the TAA defines "premises" as including "a building, aircraft, vehicle, 
vessel or place".  
67  For the meaning of "dwelling-house" and "domestic premises", see Moosa 2012 ITJ 
3. 
68  Sections 45(2) and 63(4) permit warrantless inspections and searches, respectively, 
of dwelling-houses and domestic premises with "the consent of the occupant". 
Neither requires written consent. Owing to their similarities, the submissions made 
in the discussion here apply, mutatis mutandis, to s 45(2).  
69  If section 63(1)(b)(i), (ii) or (iii) is not met then SARS's recourse is either to conduct 
a consensual search under s 63(1)(a), or to apply under s 59 for the issuance of a 
judicial warrant. 
70  The TAA does not specify the content of the consent. At a minimum, it ought to state 
the ambit of the premises which may be searched and that consent is given under s 
63(1)(a). Proof of the objective written consent criterion "may be less onerous" than 
the subjective "reasonable grounds criterion" in s 63(1)(b) discussed below (Keulder 
2015 SALJ 819 839).  
71  For discussion of the general requirements for consent, see Bovijn and Van 
Schalkwyk 2012 Stell LR 511. Since courts are the arbiters of legality, any invalid 
acts will engender legal consequences until the act is set aside on judicial review 
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certain considerations ought to apply. First, consent must stem from a 
designated person who is competent in law to grant consent.72 Secondly, 
owing to the importance of the document recording a consent, its 
implications for the rights of occupiers, the risks of abuse by SARS, and the 
need to minimise uncertainty and the potential for litigation, section 63(1)(a) 
ought to be construed as requiring signature for a valid consent, even if the 
consent is written by the person designated in section 63(1)(a).73 Thirdly, 
consent must be given freely and voluntarily and not induced by duress, 
fraud, misrepresentation or coercion. Fourthly, the consent given must be 
informed. 
It is unclear whether, procedurally, consent must be given before a search 
commences, or if it may be given after the search starts but before its 
completion, or if consent may be given after completion of the search. 
Compliance with section 63(1)(a) ought to be regarded as met if the timing 
of consent is before a search commences, albeit in an oral form, provided 
the consent is later, at any time, reduced to writing. That this prescribed 
formality occurred after completion of the search ought not to vitiate an 
otherwise valid consent. This approach accords with a purposive 
interpretation of section 63(1). 
Whilst section 63(1)(a) authorises consent by "the owner74 or person in 
control of the premises", neither term is defined in the TAA. Contextually, 
                                            
(MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) 
paras 100 103). 
72  Neither s 63(1)(a) nor s 63(4) refers to the granting of consent by an agent of "the 
owner or person in control of the premises" or "the occupant" (as the case may be). 
If consent is invalid then entry to the premises is unlawful and the fruit of any search 
would be tainted. Under s 66(1), SARS can be requested to "return some or all of 
the seized material" and to "pay the costs of physical damage caused during the 
conduct of a search and seizure". If it refuses then, under s 66(2), an application may 
be brought for a court order obliging "the return of the seized material or payment of 
compensation for physical damage caused". Despite the llegality, SARS may, in 
terms of s 66(4), seek a court order authorising the retention of seized material or a 
copy of relevant material. Such an order may be granted if it is in the interests of 
justice. This is to be determined with reference to all legally relevant factors, including 
prejudice to any party, the reasonableness of SARS's explanation for non-
compliance with the law, the competing rights and interests of the parties, and the 
effect on tax administration and the administration of justice if the order is not granted 
in SARS's favour.  
73  Signature is an objective, reliable fact serving as concrete proof of consent. Strict 
formalities for a valid signature ought not to be required. Pencil signatures, 
signatures by initials or by means of a stamp, mark, or by a party's writing below a 
printed heading, ought to suffice. See Van Niekerk v Smit 1952 3 SA 17 (T) 25.  
74  In terms of s 6(b) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, statutory words in the singular 
include the plural, unless a contrary intention appears. Contextually in s 63(1)(a), 
"the owner" bears its plural meaning, namely, "the owners". Therefore, if premises 
F MOOSA  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  19 
ownership is a formal, legal relationship between the consenting party and 
the premises for which consent to search is granted. It is submitted that 
"control", in the context of section 63(1)(a), refers to the ability of the grantor 
of consent to lawfully exercise a high degree of authority over the premises 
and, by extension, over the possessions and communications there. 
Generally, "control" may be legal or physical.75 The former refers to persons 
enjoying possessory rights (such as a licensee, hirer and lessee). Physical 
control refers to actual custody of property (such as a ship's captain, an 
employee, an office manager, property manager, and property agent). It is 
submitted that in section 63(1)(a), "person in control" applies to both 
categories of persons referred to here. Whether legal or physical control 
exists is a factual issue to be decided on merit in each case. 
Under sections 45(2) and 63(4), a SARS official may not "enter a dwelling-
house or domestic premises … without the consent of the occupant".76 The 
term “occupant” is undefined in the TAA. "Occupant" is utilised as a noun in 
sections 45(2) and 63(4). The Oxford Thesaurus77 defines "occupant" when 
used as a noun to mean "resident, inhabitant, owner, householder, tenant, 
renter, leaseholder, lessee, addressee". Based on this meaning, "the 
occupant" in sections 45(2) and 63(4) would include owners and persons in 
legal or physical control of premises in the sense explained above. 
As a safeguard for privacy rights, "the occupant" ought to be construed to 
cover only persons occupying the part of a dwelling-house or domestic 
premises sought to be inspected or searched. This construction would 
ensure that no occupier may lawfully consent to the invasion of another 
occupier's privacy, unless the grantor of consent was duly authorised. 
Accordingly, the grantor of consent must be a person competent in law to 
give consent in the sense that he/she is empowered or entitled as of right 
to give consent that is binding on, and enforceable against, the person(s) 
                                            
are co-owned then, on a strict interpretation of the TAA that makes no provision for 
consent by an agent, each co-owner must consent personally. Consent by one 
owner would not be binding on another, nor would it constitute consent by "the 
owner". It is consent by "an owner". A strict interpretation ought to be avoided. 
Common sense dictates that consent ought to be valid if granted by anyone 
authorised to do so on behalf of a designated person. This is because it caters for 
situations where a designated person is unavailable and ensures that s 63(1)(a) is 
workable in cases where "the owner" is a juristic person which, obviously, cannot act 
in person.  
75  Cohen Commissioner's Powers to Access Information 30-31. 
76  In accordance with s 6(b) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, contextually in ss 45(2) 
and 63(4), "the occupant" bears its plural meaning, namely "the occupants". The 
submission made above in n 73 applies, mutatis mutandis, to "the occupant".  
77  Waite, Hollingworth and Marshall Oxford Paperback Thesaurus 573. 
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whose home or property is inspected or searched, and/or whose 
possessions and/or communications may be seized. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that "the occupant" refers to the occupier who is 
authorised to be on the premises and who, at the time of the inspection or 
search, habitually resides there. This construction is consistent with the 
reference to "the" occupant and not "an" or "any" occupant. Consequently, 
on the one hand, "the occupant" would exclude trespassers, land invaders, 
vagrants, squatters, visitors, contractors, guests, house-sitters and 
babysitters. On the other hand, a live-in worker (such as, a butler, domestic 
worker, housekeeper, nurse, or child carer) would be encompassed by "the 
occupant". 
5.2.2  Warrantless search on reasonable grounds 
Section 63(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) prescribes narrowly stated jurisdictional limits 
for conducting non-consensual, warrantless searches. A senior SARS 
official has discretion ("may") to conduct a search without judicial oversight. 
This power is earmarked for exceptional or rare situations when an 
apprehension, premised "on reasonable grounds", exists that a decision has 
been taken (action is "imminent") to remove or destroy relevant material. 
Section 63(1)(b) enables SARS to react speedily to real, not illusory, 
situations that give rise to genuine, not fabricated or contrived, concerns 
about imminent, not far-off, dangers to tax administration as may be caused 
by probable, not speculative or conjectural, efforts to remove or destroy 
relevant material. SARS must prove that the jurisdictional facts are met for 
the lawful exercise of discretion under section 63(1)(b).78 If they are present, 
then a taxpayer or other affected person challenging the lawfulness of the 
search bears the onus to show that the discretion was exercised unlawfully. 
This is so, irrespective of whether or not an infringement of a right is at 
stake.79 
                                            
78  Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 45. A 
presumption operates that powers will be exercised fairly in all circumstances 
(Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 
152). Failure to do so may be shown by proof that a decision was arrived at 
arbitrarily, capriciously, mala fide, due to an unwarranted adherence to a fixed 
principle, or in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose or motive. It may also 
be shown by proof that the administrator misconceived the nature of the discretion 
or power and took account of irrelevant considerations or ignored relevant ones, or 
that the decision is so grossly unreasonable as to justify an inference that the 
administrator failed to properly apply his mind to the issue at hand (Thint (Pty) Ltd v 
NDPP; Zuma v NDPP 2009 1 SA 1 (CC) paras 91-93).  
79  Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) paras 37, 49-53. 
Harms DP held, at para 31, that if the aim, object or purpose of the exercise of a 
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Linguistically, "imminent" provides no specificity as to the time that would 
need to pass for a reasonably foreseen danger to qualify as imminent. This 
creates a conundrum. Since no definitive time can be laid down for an event 
to be regarded as "imminent", the issue of whether a removal or destruction 
is imminent is a factual issue to be decided on merit in each case. In the 
context of section 63(1)(b)(i), it is submitted that “imminent” means 
"impending or threatening".80 This meaning has the effect that section 
63(1)(b)(i) does not contemplate a clear and present danger but rather a 
probable and impending removal or destruction of relevant material, or the 
threat thereof that, if materialised, would undermine "the administration of a 
tax Act" as defined (see footnote 19 above). Imminent is also distinguishable 
from "immediate". Naturally, section 63(1)(b) applies if there may be an 
immediate removal or destruction of relevant material likely to be found on 
premises. However, the more stringent requirement of an immediate 
removal or destruction is not imposed by section 63(1)(b). 
A grammatical and contextual interpretation of "may be" and "likely", as 
used in section 63(1)(b)(i), indicates that the words refer to measurements 
of expectation involving "a result that is probable, objectively considered".81 
When these words are viewed in the light of the phrase "reasonable grounds 
is satisfied", then the expectation must be "that which would reasonably be 
expected".82 Thus construed, the cumulative effect of "reasonable grounds 
is satisfied", "may be" and "likely" is that the circumstances to which they 
relate need not exist as concrete or absolute facts, nor do they later, at 
judicial review, need be shown to have existed when the discretion to 
conduct a search was exercised. In their contexts, they simply require a 
reasonable likelihood or probability, objectively considered with reference to 
credible facts, that a removal or destruction of "relevant material" is 
"imminent". Accordingly, a belief based on unfounded claims or 
unsubstantiated allegations, or on mere speculation or conjecture, would 
not suffice to trigger the lawful application of the invasive tool catered for by 
section 63(1)(b). 
The intention with which a removal or destruction occurs is irrelevant. Of 
importance is that such acts relate to "relevant material" as defined. Section 
                                            
discretion is lawful, then the existence of an ulterior motive ought not to taint the 
exercise of the power with nullity. For a criticism of the distinction between the 
"object" and "motive" of an act, see Neethling 2011 THRHR 665-668. 
80  Bovijn and Van Schalkwyk 2012 Stell LR 512. 
81  Transnet Ltd v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 All SA 352 (SCA) para 42.  
82  Transnet Ltd v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 All SA 352 (SCA) para 42. 
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22(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act,83 which is substantially or materially 
similar in content to section 63(1)(b) of the TAA, was described in 
Raliphaswa v Mugivhi84 as "designed to protect rights to privacy against 
abuse of power by members of the SAPS".85 By parity of reasoning, the 
requirements in section 63(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) are internal limits aimed at 
protecting privacy and other inter-related, mutually supporting rights against 
abuse by SARS officials. Hence, strict compliance with the stipulations of 
section 63(1)(b) is required. 
Non-satisfaction of the good cause criteria in section 63(1)(b) would render 
a search to be an unjustifiable violation of a taxpayer's privacy and other 
associated right (such as, property or dignity).86 Moreover, under section 
35(5) of the Constitution, information obtained unlawfully will be 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings against a taxpayer if its admission 
"would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice".87 As regards its admissibility in civil proceedings, 
a judicial officer has the discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence if the circumstances justify such a course.88 This determination 
must be made judiciously after taking into account all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including the nature of the evidence, the extent of a right's 
violation (if any), whether the evidence could be lawfully obtained, and if the 
evidence would in the ordinary course have been obtained lawfully.89 
                                            
83  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. See Gaertner v Minister of Finance 2014 1 SA 
442 (CC) para 73. 
84  Raliphaswa v Mugivhi 2008 4 SA 154 (SCA) 159A.  
85  The search and seizure powers in s 63, and the power of inspection in s 45, ought 
to be sufficiently circumscribed as regards timing, place and scope, because 
overbreadth must be avoided. First, overbreadth causes a failure to inform an 
occupier of the limits of an inspection or search. Secondly, overbreadth may leave 
an inspector without sufficient guidelines in accordance with which to conduct the 
inspection or search within legal limits. Thirdly, overbreadth permits greater privacy 
intrusions that extend beyond circumstances where the reasonable expectation of 
privacy, for example, is low, to situations where the reasonable expectation is high. 
See Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board 2006 5 SA 250 (CC) para 
71.  
86  The Court, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 
46 (CC) para 23, held: "All the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually 
supporting." Also see Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) para 27. 
87  For further discussion, see Thint (Pty) Ltd v NDPP; Zuma v NDPP 2009 1 SA 1 (CC) 
paras 215-224. Also see De Vos 2011 TSAR 270-271, 274-279.  
88  Zeffertt and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 772-775; Schwikkard and Van 
der Merwe Principles of Evidence 264-266. See also De Vos 2011 TSAR 279-281. 
89  Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd v Matus 1998 2 SA 617 (C) para 92. 
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The exercise of discretion under section 63(1)(b) is reviewable conduct 
under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.90 Any such review is also 
subject to the general principles of administrative law.91 A senior SARS 
official must apply his mind to the available facts in accordance with the 
"behests of the statute and the tenets of natural justice".92 This means that 
the discretion must be exercised within the limits of the empowering TAA 
provision and subject to the Constitution.93 To be lawful, the discretion must 
be exercised bona fide and judiciously by an impartial official acting 
independently.94 SARS also bears the onus to show that a rational 
connection exists between a search, on the one hand, and the 
governmental purpose or State interest served thereby on the other. In the 
absence of rationality, which must be determined objectively,95 a search 
would be arbitrary and inconsistent with the rule of law. In an evaluation of 
whether a senior SARS official acted rationally, the human rights context of 
the impugned decision is important. The more the decision interferes with a 
fundamental right(s), the greater the force of SARS's justification must be. 
7 Conclusion 
Sections 45 and 63 of the TAA facilitate the achievement of effective tax 
administration. However, this article demonstrates that the powers 
conferred thereby are to be exercised with due regard for taxpayers' 
fundamental rights to privacy, property and dignity, inter alia. This article 
                                            
90  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
91  Van Dorsten 2005 Taxpayer 212. 
92  Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS 2001 1 SA 1109 (CC) para 40.  
93  Unconstrained discretionary powers violate the rule of law in the Constitution. See 
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 47. It is a matter of interpretation 
whether limits exist on discretion. See Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para 36.  
94  In a review of the exercise of discretion on the basis that the decision to search is 
unlawful, irrational, unreasonable or procedurally unfair, the taxpayer must identify 
both the facts upon which the cause of action is premised and the legal basis thereof. 
Generally, this requires an applicant to specify the PAJA provision(s) upon which 
reliance is placed. See CSARS v Prudence Forwarding (Pty) Ltd 2016 78 SATC 119 
para 32. For a discussion of administrative reviews, see De Ville Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 172-177. 
95  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 85-86. Harms DP, in Minister of 
Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 (SCA) para 39, held: "The standard 
is not breached because an officer exercises the discretion in a manner other than 
that deemed optimal by the court. A number of choices may be open to him, all of 
which may fall within the range of rationality. The standard is not perfection, or even 
the optimum, judged from the vantage of hindsight and so long as the discretion is 
exercised within this range, the standard is not breached."  
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demonstrates further that, upon a careful analysis and comparison of 
sections 45 and 63, key differences exist in their substantive content and 
practical operation. These are: first, whereas the powers in section 45 are 
exercisable by a "SARS official" (as defined in the TAA), the powers in 
section 63 are exercisable by a "senior SARS official" (as defined in the 
TAA). Secondly, whereas section 63(1)(a) provides for a search with the 
written consent of the owner or person in control of the premises, no 
provision is made in section 45 for an inspection to occur with the written 
consent of anyone. Under section 45(2), entry to a part of a dwelling-house 
or domestic premises not used for trade purposes may occur with the oral, 
tacit or implied consent of the occupant thereof. Thirdly, whereas section 45 
permits routine (non-targeted) and non-routine (targeted) inspections, 
section 63 permits only non-routine searches. Fourthly, whereas section 45 
permits only the inspection of material, section 63 permits the search of 
"premises" as defined and the seizure of material. Fifthly, whereas section 
45 does not permit the seizure of material, section 63 read with section 61(3) 
does. Sixthly, whereas an inspection may occur only at premises where "a 
trade or enterprise" is carried on, a search may occur at any premises, 
whether used for trade or non-trade purposes. Seventh, whereas a 
"reasonable belief that a trade … is being carried on" is a pre-requisite for 
entry to a home without consent under sections 45(2), no such or similar 
requirement applies under section 63(4). Eighth, whereas section 45(1) only 
permits inspections at premises of a taxpayer whose tax affairs are to be 
checked for compliance, section 63 permits searches of premises of both 
the relevant taxpayer whose affairs are the subject of the search as well as 
third parties associated with the taxpayer. Ninth, whereas warrantless 
searches are permitted on the grounds of urgency and expediency in 
exceptional circumstances only, an inspection is warrantless under all 
circumstances. 
Tenth, an inspection is geared to determine any of the facts listed in sections 
45(1)(a), (b) and (c). An inspection does not occur because of a suspicion 
or belief of non-compliance with a tax obligation. However, the basis for a 
search under section 63 is an alleged failure to comply with a tax obligation, 
or the commission of a tax offence. Eleventh, unlike section 63(2), the 
provisions of section 45 do not require a SARS official to inform "the person 
occupying the premises" that the inspection is conducted under section 45, 
nor does it require such a person to be informed of the reason for the 
inspection. Twelfth, whereas section 45 fails to outline any procedural 
guidelines or directions for conducting an inspection, section 63(3) 
stipulates that the procedural and other guidelines in sections 61(4)-(8) 
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apply to all warrantless searches. Finally, whereas section 61(3) provides 
some guidance as to the scope of the search and seizure powers 
exercisable under section 63, no guidance is given in the TAA as to the 
scope of the powers exercisable at an inspection under section 45. These 
distinctions between sections 45 and 63 aid a better understanding of where 
the red lines are between their respective provisions.  
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